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A Model-Theoretic Account of
Representation (Or, I Don’t Know Much
about Art . . . but I Know It Involves
Isomorphism)
Steven Frenchyz
Discussions of representation in science tend to draw on examples from art. However, such
examples need to be handled with care given a) the diﬀerences between works of art and
scientiﬁc theories and b) the accommodation of these examples within certain philosophies
of art. I shall examine the claim that isomorphism is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for
representation and I shall argue that there exist accounts of representation in both art and
science involving isomorphism which accommodate the apparent counterexamples and,
moreover, allow us to understand how ‘‘impossible’’ artistic objects and inconsistent scien-
tiﬁc theories can be said to represent.
1. Introduction.Most of us would accept that scientiﬁc theories represent,
although there has been relatively little consideration of the nature of this
representative function. What discussions there have been have tended to
import preestablished conceptions from analyses of representation in the
arts, language, cognition, and so forth. Of course, which of these analyses
one favors will depend on how one conceives of theories in the ﬁrst place.
If one thinks of them in terms of an axiomatized set of logico-linguistic
statements, then one might naturally be drawn to accounts of linguistic
representation in which notions of denotation, for example, feature prom-
inently. If, on the other hand, one conceives of theories in nonlinguistic
yTo contact the author, please write to: Division of History and Philosophy of Science,
University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK; e-mail: s.r.d.french@leeds.ac.uk.
z I am grateful to a number of people for discussions on this topic, including Ota´vio Bueno,
Matthew Kieran, James Ladyman, and Mauricio Suarez but most especially Alirio Rosales
and the MA students who took my ‘‘Issues in Philosophy of Science’’ module. Of course, I
should take the blame for any artistic misjudgments or philosophical infelicities.
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terms, as in the model-theoretic approach, then onemight look to analyses of
representation in the arts where notions of resemblance tend to be brought
to the fore.
Van Fraassen, for example, has imported such an analysis into his dis-
cussion of representation in science and argued that an appropriate account
of resemblance can be given in terms of the set-theoretic relation of iso-
morphism (1994). This has been strongly criticized by Suarez, who argues
that just as isomorphism cannot capture representation in art, so it is
inappropriate in the scientiﬁc context as well (1999). Similarly, Hughes
draws on Goodman’s rejection of resemblance in art in favor of denotation
and, rather confusingly perhaps, favors the latter whilst also maintaining
the model-theoretic view of theories (1997). In what follows, I shall
examine the debate in terms of three claims:
Isomorphism is not suﬃcient for representation;
Isomorphism is not necessary for representation;
Models denote and do not resemble.
Each of these claims will be questioned and I will conclude by suggesting
that, through appropriate modiﬁcations, a form of isomorphism can serve
to underpin representation in both the arts and science.
2. Isomorphism is Not Suﬃcient for Representation. That isomorphism
is not suﬃcient for representation seems to be acknowledged by all
participants in the discussion. Consider, for example, some markings left
by wind and sea on a stretch of sand: even if these were isomorphic to a
face for example, still, it is typically suggested, we would not say that the
markings represented a face. The crucial element that is missing in such
cases is that of intention: in order for something—a painting, a sculpture,
markings in the sand, whatever—to represent, there must be the relevant
intention involved (van Fraassen 1994; see also Suarez 1999). And—or so
it is claimed—the same must hold for representation in science.
But why must it? Let us consider again the face in the sand. Here the
issue, I suggest, is not so much the nature of representation but the prior
one of whether such a face constitutes art or not. Consider the analogous
case of the sea and wind carving the Lorentz transformations into the sand.
Are we going to similarly insist that such markings do not represent rela-
tivistic phenomena of some sort because the relevant intention is absent?
The diﬀerence seems to be that in the latter case we do not take the causal
provenance of the markings themselves as having any bearing on the
constitution of the theory as an object. The theory is ‘‘there’’ in the sand, in
a sense, in a way in which the respective work of art is not. And, of course,
this is what lies behind those recurrent and amusing stories of works of art
being mistaken for heaps of rubbish for example (one of the most recent
1473 steven french
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700551
such examples being Damien Hurst’s ad hoc gallery ‘‘installation’’ of the
detritus of the artist’s studio, which was subsequently swept away and put
into bin liners by the gallery’s caretaker).
What this relates to is an ontological issue: what is a theory? We should
note immediately that a similar question can be asked about certain kinds
of art—such as musical compositions for example, and some of the dis-
cussions here bear a similarity with those in the philosophy of science—
but in the case of paintings, say, or sculpture, an answer is forthcoming
comparatively easily. Putting things rather crudely for the moment, we
could point to the massive rectangle of canvas on the wall of the Spanish
pavilion and say ‘‘That is Picasso’s Guernica,’’ or similarly, point to the
tank full of formaldehyde and say ‘‘That is Hurst’s cow and calf.’’
However, we are typically reluctant to similarly appeal to ostension in
picking out the theory of relativity, say. The black marks in my photocopy
of Einstein’s 1905 paper do not constitute the theory, any more than do the
marks in Einstein’s original draft or the wind-blown squiggles on the beach.
And it is precisely this point that is drawn upon by adherents of the model-
theoretic approach—such as van Fraassen—when they urge that theories
should be regarded as extra-linguistic entities. But if they are so regarded
then the distinction between marks that were intended by Einstein to
represent certain phenomena and marks carved into the sand by the wind,
appears to evaporate.
My suggestion, then, is that drawing on representation in art in order to
power a discussion of representation in science is not entirely straightfor-
ward. In particular, whereas intentions are typically drawn upon in art in
order to distinguish ‘‘artistic’’ objects from other kinds,1 this is not the case
in science. Hence arguments in which resemblance or its formal equivalent
is not suﬃcient to capture the representational relationship in the case of
theories, because intention needs to be added to the mix, may not be as
powerful as might be ﬁrst thought.
3. Isomorphism is Not Necessary for Representation. The principle
argument for this claim is that there exist examples of works of art which
are not, indeed, cannot be, isomorphic to anything because, at one extreme,
they enter into a multiplicity of representational relationships and, at the
other, they may enter into no such relationship (Suarez 1999). Thus, as an
example of the ﬁrst possibility, consider Picasso’s Guernica. In this case—
it is claimed—on the one hand it represents the ‘‘concrete pain’’ of the
inhabitants of Guernica but on the other it also represents the ‘‘more ab-
stract threat’’ posed by the rise of fascism in Europe. Therefore, ‘‘the canvas
cannot be placed into a one-to-one correspondence, not to mention an
1. And also to pick out a preferred interpretation, although I shall not discuss this here.
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isomorphism, with those things that it represents’’ (1999, 78). At the other
extreme, the example of Mondrian is given and it is suggested that to focus
on representation in such cases is to miss the point of the art: ‘‘[t]his type of
abstract painting is capable of inducing esthetic, or emotive responses, but
it does not do so by ‘representing’ anything’’ (1999, 79).2
However, such cases do not decisively rule out an account of repre-
sentation based on isomorphism, as Budd, for example, demonstrates
(Budd 1993). His approach begins with a crucial distinction between
one’s ‘‘visual world’’ and one’s ‘‘visual ﬁeld’’:
My visual world at any time is the complete way the world is then
represented to me by my visual experience. My visual ﬁeld is a certain
aspect of the way the world is represented to me by my visual expe-
rience. (Budd 1993, 158)
The relationship between the two can be understood in terms of
abstraction: my visual experience represents the world as a collection of
objects ‘‘spread out in three-dimensional space’’ and my visual ﬁeld is
what is left when we abstract the apparent distance of these objects from
me. Thus, for example, if my visual world contains a circular object that is
titled away from me, then within my visual ﬁeld this object will appear
elliptical. As Budd makes clear, one should not characterize this diﬀerence
in terms of the visual world and visual ﬁeld containing diﬀerent objects,
but rather in terms of diﬀerent accounts of how my visual experience
represents the world as being, one complete and one partial. This dis-
tinction then allows Budd to ﬁrm up the claim that a painting represents by
sharing properties with its subject:
[A] picture looks like what it depicts only with respect to properties of
the spectator’s visual ﬁeld, not those conﬁned to his visual world.
(Budd 1993, 159)
This ‘‘sharing’’ of properties can then be captured via the notion of
isomorphism, where this is taken to hold between the structure of the sur-
face of the painting and the structure of the relevant visual ﬁeld. So when
you look at a painting, what you see is the structure of the surface of the
2. Mondrian is not, perhaps, the best example to give in support of such a claim, since he fa-
mously rejected the representational or nonrepresentational dichotomy, arguing that his work
was ‘‘representational’’ in a broad sense that encompassed the representation of pure
relationships, or structure. A better example might be that of Rothko’s work but nevertheless
one could still insist that, unlike such artistic objects, scientiﬁc models and theories are not
intended to produce aesthetic or emotive responses (at least not primarily) and so to that
extent, such cases do not count as legitimate counterexamples. In other words, pointing to
cases of nonrepresentational art does nothing to undermine isomorphism-based accounts of
representation in science.
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painting as being isomorphic with the structure of the visual ﬁeld of the
state of aﬀairs that the painting depicts. This yields the following account
of pictorial representation:
First, your experience must involve a visual awareness of the presence
before you of a marked surface. Secondly, you must see the structure
of the surface as being isomorphic with the structure of the visual ﬁeld
representation of the picture’s subject when seen from a certain point
of view, namely, that from which it has been depicted. (1993, 161)
Putting it in a nutshell, representation consists in the perceived iso-
morphism of structure (1993, 162; my emphasis).
As an illustration of this approach, Budd considers Holbein’s famous
picture, The Ambassadors. Here, as is well known, the foreground of the
painting includes a depiction of a skull that is represented anamorphically,
so that it appears as a skull only if looked at from one side of the picture.
From Budd’s point of view, the depiction of the skull is isomorphic with
the representation in the visual ﬁeld of a skull in the precise sense that
there exists a one-to-one mapping between the points that compose the
two, but
you see it as being structurally isomorphic only when you see it from
the side and accordingly, you see it as a depiction of a skull only from
that unusual, oblique point of view, not when looking at it from straight
on. (1993, 162)
Even more signiﬁcantly, cases of ‘‘abstract’’ art can also be accommo-
dated. First of all, it must be acknowledged that in many cases the visual
ﬁeld representation of the picture surface may be ‘‘strikingly unlike’’ that
of the relevant state of aﬀairs. The perceived dissimilarities can take two
(obvious) forms: the visual ﬁeld representation of the picture surface can
lack features possessed by the visual ﬁeld representation of what is
depicted, or the former can possess additional features that the latter does
not. Of course, as Budd is clear to note, this absence or presence of features
does not imply that the spectator sees what is depicted as lacking or
possessing the relevant features. The absence of color in a black and white
drawing, for example, is not understood by the spectator as indicative of a
lack of color in what is being depicted but only as not indicating any color;
as Budd puts it, ‘‘the object, as depicted, has an indeﬁnite appearance in
the dimension of color.’’ By eschewing color, the artist’s intention is
simply ‘‘to depict only the spatial structure of a state of aﬀairs and the
comparative brightness of its parts, perhaps, not the colours of its con-
stituent objects’’ (1993, 164). Likewise, a spectator viewing a painting or
drawing in which stippling or cross-hatching is used to represent variations
in tone does not read these features into the objects being depicted. In
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general, we typically—but not always—abstract from certain details of the
picture surface.
Thus, in considering the example of Picasso’s Head of a Girl, the loops
and spirals of Picasso’s drawing correspond to the visual-ﬁeld representa-
tion of a girl’s hair only when other features are abstracted away. In gen-
eral, schematic depictions resemble the visual-ﬁeld representations of the
corresponding objects ‘‘only with respect to the structural features they
depict’’ (1993, 164). As Budd emphasizes, the perceived isomorphism
refers to structure ‘‘at a certain level of detail’’ (1993, 165) and one can
easily see how this account also accommodates Picasso’s Guernica. It can
be extended to cover Mondrian’s work as well, if this is understood as a
form of schematic depiction in which what is being depicted is ‘‘pure
relationship.’’3
More intriguingly, Budd claims that it can capture depictions of
‘‘impossible’’ or contradictory objects such as these featured in the works
of Escher, for example. If we consider the famous case of the three-
pronged tuning fork, which has two rectangular bars at one end and three
cylindrical bars at the other, then what we have, in eﬀect, are two incom-
patible isomorphisms:
[I]f we direct our gaze at one end of the conﬁguration of lines we see
the structure of the lines as being isomorphic with that of visual ﬁeld
representation of two rectangular bars, whereas if we look at the other
end the lines look to be structurally isomorphic with the visual ﬁeld
representation of three cylindrical bars. (1993, 166)
However, we cannot impose on the lines a single, consistent interpre-
tation and attempts to do so lead to well-known visual discomfort.
What can we conclude from all this? First of all, that accounts of repre-
sentation in art that invoke isomorphism cannot be so easily dismissed (at
least not on the basis of the examples so far presented). Secondly, that one
such account can accommodate what might, at ﬁrst sight, seem to be the
problematic cases of representation in ‘‘abstract’’ art, such as Picasso’s
Guernica, the representation of pure structure, as in Mondrian and the rep-
resentation of ‘‘inconsistent’’ objects, as in Escher’s drawings. As I shall
indicate, in capturing such cases, this account oﬀers a nice parallel to a
generalization of the model-theoretic account as applied to theories and
models in science.
3. Budd emphasizes that his account is not restricted to isomorphisms relating to spatial
structure but can incorporate color, texture, brightness and so on: ‘‘there is not only a
perceived isomorphism of spatial relations but a correspondence of perceived colour: the
spectator sees the picture not merely as a structural spatial isomorph but also as a chromatic
icon’’ (1993, 167).
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4. Models Denote and Do Not Resemble. Budd’s approach can be
understood as part of the backlash to Goodman’s classic rejection of
resemblance-based accounts of representation in favor of one based on
denotation (Goodman 1969). Moving back from art into science, Hughes
has incorporated Goodman’s account into the model-theoretic framework,
yielding his own DDI (Denotation, Demonstration, and Interpretation)
view (Hughes 1997). A model then ‘‘stands for’’ or refers to a physical
system, and elements of the model denote elements of the subject. Fur-
thermore, scientiﬁc representations possess an ‘‘internal dynamic’’ that al-
lows us to make predictions of both everyday and, crucially, novel facts.
Through this internal dynamic we ‘‘demonstrate’’ the relevant results. And
a given model may provide the internal dynamic of another so that we get a
hierarchy of models, and of representations, in which a model at one level
of the hierarchy is the subject of and represented by a model at a higher
level. Finally, these results that are demonstrated within the model have to
be interpreted in terms of its subject. It is only after such interpretation that
we can see ‘‘whether theoretical conclusions correspond to the phenomena,
and hence whether the theory is empirically adequate’’ (1997, 333).
However, transporting Goodman’s approach into the scientiﬁc context
is not unproblematic. As is well known, the primary basis for his rejection
of resemblance is the perceived lack of correspondence between the
properties of resemblance and representation: the former is symmetric
and reﬂexive, for example, whereas the latter is not (Goodman 1969, 4).
The obvious way to overcome this objection is to insist that we do not
simply model a phenomenon, we model it as something. Thus, for exam-
ple, we model a gas as a system of billiard balls, or we model a super-
conductor as a giant diamagnet (see French and Ladyman 1997). Fur-
thermore, even if it is granted that when it comes to artistic objects,
‘‘almost anything may stand for anything else’’ (Goodman 1969, 5), it is
not clear that this is the case for models. Not anything can serve as a
scientiﬁc model of a physical system; if the appropriate relationships are
not in place between the relevant properties then the ‘‘model’’ will not be
deemed scientiﬁc.
Hughes’s emphasis on denotation also puts him at odds with the model-
theoretic approach he espouses. Words are typically held to have denota-
tion and, of course, the analysis of how words represent might well be, and
typically is, quite diﬀerent from the analysis of pictorial representation.4
Furthermore, denotation itself cannot do all the work, as Hughes acknowl-
4. It is worth noting that Hendry and Psillos have developed a view of theories according to
which they combine elements from diﬀerent representational media, such as mathematics
and natural language (see Hendry 1999). On such a view, representation might be analyzed
in terms of some combination of denotation and isomorphism although it is not clear quite
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edges. One must also include some account of interpretation, but if one is
going to do that, why bother with denotation to begin with? Why not return
to an account based on isomorphism?5
More importantly, however, in describing the relationship between
theories and models from the perspective of his approach, Hughes draws
on an interesting example. Unlike Suarez, he allows for the possibility that
both ‘‘low-level’’ models and ‘‘high-level’’ theories represent. In particular
he notes that Bohr’s famous atomic model can be described as a ‘‘local’’
model and represents a clearly speciﬁed type of system (1997, 330). Quan-
tum mechanics, on the other hand, can be considered a ‘‘global’’ theory
and deals with a heterogeneous collection of physical systems. In this case
we can still say that there is representation insofar as each individual
system in this collection can be represented by a particular model deﬁned
in terms of the theory. What a global theory deﬁnes is not a particular
model but a class of models and in the application of the theory to a par-
ticular system, it is a ‘‘local’’ member of this class that represents. Ac-
cording to Hughes, ‘‘[t]here is thus no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
representations supplied by local and global theories’’ (1997, 331).
Now, in the case of the Bohr’s model of the atom we have a famously
inconsistent model and in this context it raises the issue of whether and in
what sense one can have inconsistent representations. On the Goodman
account, one would have to appeal to some notion of inconsistent
denotation, that could perhaps be related to the various forms of para-
consistent logic that are widely available. Alternatively, one could try to
accommodate such cases within the model-theoretic approach, although
there have been relatively few studies along such lines.
Laymon, for example, notes that one of the advantages of the model
theoretic approach is that it
allows for easy and revealing consideration of computational concerns
and . . . allows for the coherent use within a calculation of inconsistent
theories. (Laymon 1988, 262–263)
Thus his primary concern is with the way in which theories that are
inconsistent with one another are used to account for phenomena, rather
than with the explanatory role of internally inconsistent theories them-
selves. However, he does emphasize the role of idealizations and approx-
imations in generating a certain ‘‘looseness of ﬁt’’ between theories and
their computational consequences, suﬃcient to allow mutually inconsistent
5. I am grateful to my MA students for raising these latter issues.
how this would work. In personal correspondence I have argued that anything this ‘‘inter-
active’’ view can do, the model-theoretic approach can do as well, but more straightforwardly,
although I will not pursue this here.
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theories to be used. Now, idealization and approximation can be accom-
modated within the model-theoretic approach through the introduction of
‘‘partial isomorphisms’’ as the fundamental relationship between theoret-
ical and data models (see French and Ladyman 1998). In particular, they
allow for the way in which two models can ‘‘share’’ parts of their structure.
The technical details have been given elsewhere, but, in summary, are as
follows: A partial structure is a set-theoretic construct a = hD, Ri,iiVa I,
where D is a nonempty set and each Ri is a partial relation. A partial
relation Ri, iVa I over D is a relation which is not necessarily deﬁned for all
n-tuples of elements of D (see da Costa and French 1990, 255). Each
partial relation R can be viewed as an ordered triple hR1,R2,R3i, where R1,
R2, and R3 are mutually disjoint sets, with R1MR2MR3 = A
n, and such that:
R1 is the set of n-tuples that belong to R, R2 is the set of n-tuples that do not
belong to R, and R3 is the set of n-tuples for which it is not deﬁned whether
they belong or not to R. If we have two partial structures
a ¼ hD ,RkikVaK
and
a V¼ hD0 , RVkikVaK
(where Rk and RVk are partial relations as above, so that Rk = hRk1, Rk2,
Rk3i and RVk = hRVk1, RVk2, RVk3i) then a function f from D to DV is a
partial isomorphism between a and a V if 1) f is a bijective and 2) for all
x and y in D, Rk1xy iﬀ RVk1 f (x) f (y) and Rk2xy iﬀ RVk2 f (x) f (y) (French and
Ladyman 1999; Bueno 1997). Of course, if Rk3 = RVk3 = ø, so that we no
longer have partial structures but ‘‘total’’ ones, then we recover the
standard notion of isomorphism (see Bueno 1997).
In terms of this framework, one can then understand how ‘‘computa-
tional consequences’’ can be obtained from an ‘‘internally’’ inconsistent
theory such as Bohr’s (see da Costa and French forthcoming). It is by ac-
knowledging that there is a certain internal ‘‘looseness of ﬁt’’ between the
component elements of the model, that inconsistency can be comfortably
accommodated. However, my concern here is with the issue of how such a
model might be said to represent, for, in a sense, the corresponding
‘‘object’’ or system is an impossible one.
Here I can only sketch a response (some of the details can be found in
da Costa and French forthcoming): putting things a little crudely, Bohr’s
theory contains elements of both quantum and classical physics and if we
were to focus on each element to the exclusion of the other, we might be
tempted to say the theory represents a quantum or classical system re-
spectively. However, this would be to ignore what eﬀectively ‘‘binds’’ the
theory into a whole and allows the two disparate elements to coexist, as it
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were, and that is Bohr’s central notion of a ‘‘stationary state.’’ It is here that
the two contradictory elements come together: classical mechanics applies
to the dynamics of the electron in the stationary state, while quantum
theory comes in when the transition between such states is considered.
However, it is important to note that it is not only in the discreteness of the
stationary states that we have conﬂict between quantum and classical
physics but also in what has been called ‘‘one of the most audacious
postulates ever seen in physics’’ (Pais 1991, 147), namely, the assertion
that the ground state is stable, so that an electron in such a state will not
radiate energy and spiral into the nucleus as determined by classical
physics. This is the central inconsistency of the Bohr model and together
with their discrete nature it is what makes the stationary states so peculiar.
Of course, as the Bohr model evolved and came to be supplanted, this
peculiarity was eventually understood in terms of the new quantum me-
chanics and as a consequence, the formal inconsistency evaporated (or,
better, came to be replaced by ‘‘higher-order’’ or interpretational incon-
gruences that the principle of complementarity was intended to resolve; see
da Costa and French forthcoming). At the time the model was proposed,
however, the notion of a stationary state was not understood at all, or at
best, only partially, and if one were to represent Bohr’s model in terms of
partial structures, the stationary states would have to be located among the
R3, as relationships which had not yet been established to hold or not.
Characterizing the model in this way one can accommodate the partial and
conceptually ‘‘blurred’’ nature of the stationary states that allows for the
internal ‘‘looseness of ﬁt’’ between the component elements of the model.
And this in turn, gives us an idea of how the model can still be said to
represent: what it represents is a system that has elements of classical and
quantum physics but has at its heart this poorly understood and concep-
tually indistinct notion.
There is a nice parallel here with Budd’s account of the artistic repre-
sentation of impossible objects: if we focus on, or abstract out, the classical
and quantum aspects of Bohr’s model, then each can be taken to represent,
respectively, classical and quantum objects. It is when these aspects are
brought together, and we wonder what the model as a whole represents,
that we experience a kind of cognitive discomfort akin to the visual dis-
comfort we encounter when we look at one of Escher’s drawings. Of
course, in the Bohr case this comfort was eventually assuaged or, perhaps,
merely transposed to the level of interpretation, through the introduction of
a formally consistent theory but—and this is marks a diﬀerence between
the scientiﬁc and artistic cases—no such developments can, or should, be
expected in the case of Escher’s work. More generally, Budd’s account can
be seen as the counterpart, for artistic objects, of the partial-structures
approach for scientiﬁc ones. Analogously to the latter case, pictorial de-
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pictions resemble the visual-ﬁeld representations of the corresponding ob-
jects only with respect to certain features and, as I noted, the perceived
isomorphism refers to structure only at a certain level of detail.
5. Conclusion. My aim in this paper has been to suggest that the
‘‘isomorphic’’ account of representation is not ruled out by the kinds of
examples that have been deployed against it. First of all, we need to be
careful in importing conclusions drawn from examples in art into the
domain of science. Secondly, even in the artistic realm a notion of
isomorphism has been defended. Furthermore, this notion is interestingly
partial: in particular, if we characterize both the structure of the surface of
the painting and the structure of the relevant visual ﬁeld in terms of
something akin to partial structures, then Budd’s central idea that the
visual-ﬁeld representation of the picture-surface can lack features pos-
sessed by the visual-ﬁeld representation of what is depicted, or the former
can possess additional features that the latter does not, can be captured in
terms of partial isomorphisms holding between these partial structures. The
parallels are perhaps most striking when it comes to the interesting case of
inconsistent representations.
Of course, this is not to deny the diﬀerences between scientiﬁc objects
and artistic ones; we could certainly invoke Budd’s account to capture the
relationships between Picasso’s sketches and the ﬁnished Guernica (as an
exercise parallel to French and Ladyman’s partial structures analysis of the
construction of the London-London model of superconductivity, for exam-
ple; see French and Ladyman 1997), but still we might balk at taking
Picasso’s masterpiece to be diachronically ‘‘open’’ in the way theories are.
Nevertheless, there are enough parallel aspects to suggest that what we
have here is a common account of representation and one that encourages
further exploration.
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